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Highlights
As a reaction to the increasing threat of terrorist attacks some European 
countries have proposed stricter security measures to protect their 
railway systems. Security is traditionally not within the competences 
of the European Union yet a conflict may arise between uncoordinated 
national measurers in the area of railway security and the common 
goal of achieving a Single European Railway Area.
The issue of security in European railways was addressed at the 13th 
Florence Rail Forum. In the EU there are different national approaches 
and philosophies regarding both the assessment of risk and the 
appropriate counter measures. Yet there is a common understanding 
that the railway system has to have better security without sacrificing 
things such as the openness of railway stations and the easy accessibility 
of trains. 
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Security: Rail is NOT Air!
A comment by Matthias Finger | FSR-Transport Director
Regulation of railway security is only in its infancy, while regulation on 
security in air transport is mature with many specific measures already 
implemented. Yet, recent terrorist attacks which directly targeted the 
European transport system (Thalys – 21 August 2015, Brussels metro 
and airport – 22 March 2016) increased the pressure especially on the 
rail sector to come up with a comprehensive and systematic approach 
to security. The 13th Florence Rail Forum discussed how security in 
rail should be approached and which actions should be taken. It was 
acknowledged that in the railway sector – unlike in air and maritime 
transport – there is currently no legal basis for imposing EU measures on 
passenger security. Indeed, this was not seen as a burden to overcome, as 
very detailed, prescriptive rules on security are not desirable because 
of the very open nature of the railway system. 
A remarkable consensus appeared among the participants. The ultimate 
‘railway sector alignment’ is even more astonishing as the perspectives 
and interests present were highly diverse:
• clearly, passengers want (more) security, yet without compromising 
the convenience of mobility (from searching to booking to travelling);
• even though they have their specific interests, the different operators 
in the railway sector – train operating companies, infrastructure 
managers, railway station owners and operators – all want to respond 
to the customers’ demands, yet also see security as a cost; and
• suppliers, in turn, at least certain ones, consider security to be a 
business opportunity yet the definition of the standards should 
consider the existing technologies available without discrimination.
In short, while all agree that security has a cost, they also agree that 
security is a must for the system and that none of the actors can achieve 
it alone. Collaboration and ‘alignment of responsibilities’ is seen as 
paramount to achievement security in the railway sector.
Three main issues arise and will have to be addressed when developing 
a European rail security agenda:
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• There is, indeed, first the question of costs, which will have to be 
proportionate to the level of security achieved; it will furthermore 
be necessary to clarify the roles and responsibilities for each of the 
actors involved in the rail security ecosystem;
• Then, there are many legal questions, such as passenger name record, 
data sharing, data protection, privacy, and many others more. While 
these will not be typical railway issues, it will nevertheless have to 
be clarified  how these matters are treated in the context of railways; 
• But, most importantly, the issue of how to approach security will 
be key: can security be added onto other sector specific issues that 
are already more advanced, such as safety or theft protection for 
example? In other words, can security be treated as an expansion of 
already existing practices, or does security have to be approached 
afresh with new actors and new rules, with the risk of creating yet 
another layer of rules, regulations and corresponding actors on 
top of the existing ones? And if so, who should be the leader (is 
it the railway sector - namely DG MOVE and the national railway 
regulatory authorities, or should the matter be treated at another 
level - namely DG HOME and the national Ministries for Internal 
Affairs)?
But, rules and regulations – be they expansions of existing or totally new 
ones – will not be the only actions needed to address the newly emerging 
challenges to security in the railway sector and industry. Technology 
inevitably will and will have to play a key role as well. “Security by design” 
has emerged as a concept that will build certain levels of security into 
technology itself. But even here arises the question of (technological) 
standards and some rules may well be necessary so that security by 
design remains affordable and non-discriminatory. The participants to 
the 13th Florence Rail Forum also stressed the importance of involving 
both staff and customers into the various security measures, be it by way 
of training (staff) or sensitizing and educating (the customers).
In all the discussions it appeared clearly that rail is not air: unlike air 
where security can and is approached from a closed or confined system 
perspective – the idea being to seal off the airplane or the airport 
from its surrounding environment –, this is not possible in rail and 
public transport more generally. Both are by definition open systems, 
concerning much bigger numbers of people (e.g., mass transport) and 
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involving public spaces and free movement (of people). Besides the 
fact that it would be technically impossible to seal off rail and public 
transport from its environment, such an approach is also not desirable. 
The goal must be to increase security in rail and public transport while 
preserving the public space, mass transportation and free movement. 
The security aspect should not be used as an excuse to stop the process 
of integration of the Single European Railway Area and to block the 
potential development of the stations into new opportunities for 
business and an element of attraction for the systems as a whole. In fact, 
stations are increasingly becoming commercial areas and gathering 
points not only for the travelers and the commuters. In this sense rail 
and public transport must be preserved from the airlines’ approach to 
security, as this approach would run contrary to everything public- and 
rail- transport stand for.
Matthias Finger
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13th Florence Rail Forum 
Florence, 25 November 2016 
Rail passenger security: is it a challenge for the Single 
European Railway Area? 
A summary of discussions: 
As a reaction to the recent terrorist attacks, measures adopted by 
different Member States are creating a tension between the legitimate 
need to guarantee rail passenger security and the ultimate goal of 
establishing a Single European Railway Area (SERA) with common 
rules for the sector across the European Union (EU). The aim of the 
13th Florence Rail Forum was to look at the most controversial aspects 
creating a tension between the need for increasing the level of security 
and market opening in the railway sector.
The Forum looked at four different aspects of railway security and their 
possible impact on the SERA and the competiveness of the sector:
• What can be done to improve security?
• What can be done to adjust and improve the security level of 
infrastructure?
• What can be done to improve staff training and to raise awareness 
among passengers?
• How should responsibility be distributed? Who should regulate 
and how?
What can be done to improve security?
Railway security: filling the gap 
The 13th Florence Rail Forum built on a shared concern expressed by 
many: securing the railway system is difficult by nature. This difficulty 
is mainly connected to the open structure of the system that makes it 
hard to directly control and monitor it. In fact, rail is a flexible mass 
transportation system used every day by millions of commuters and 
long distance travellers, who move along a wide geographical network 
across the countries. Furthermore, stations are increasingly becoming 
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public places for shopping and other activities rather than being an 
exclusive place for travellers who eventually want to board a train.
After 9/11, air transport has adopted stringent measures to reduce 
the security risk. Since then, the understanding of the vulnerabilities 
of the system has increased, and ever new countermeasures have been 
implemented. Also, in the maritime sector security inspections are 
quite advanced already. However, land transport security in general 
and railway security in particular have been less considered so far. 
In railways, attention was focused on safety rather than on security. 
However, ensuring security is (also) a prerequisite for safety. It was 
mentioned at the Forum that bringing these different cultures of safety 
and security together will be one of the challenges of the future. 
Recent terrorist attacks as well as other threats, such as illegal 
immigration, petty theft, and copper theft, require immediate action 
in the field of railway security. As a first step, a methodology for the 
perception and the assessment of the threat in the railway sector is 
needed. The so-called “risk based approach” already used in aviation 
could be a starting point to develop an efficient methodology. 
“Security by design” and “Security by policy”
Applying the “security by design” approach (which is borrowed from 
the field of information security) is a straightforward method that calls 
for the integration of security considerations at all stages of planning 
and build up, for instance of new infrastructure such as train stations 
or railway lines. Yet it becomes more difficult when new security 
requirements emerge as a reaction to current events that reveal security 
gaps in existing infrastructure.
At the Forum it was pointed out that a more holistic, integrated approach 
to railway security is needed, and that a prescriptive approach to 
security is not the answer. The concept of “Security by policy” was 
formulated, meaning that a coordinated approach to security should be 
considered as a driver for new policies’ formulation. Two aspects seem 
particularly relevant: technological alignment and cooperation among 
authorities. On the one hand, technological procedures need to be 
aligned, always bearing in mind the importance of the human factor 
in security design. On the other hand, authorities’ cooperation is an 
opportunity to come up with increasingly effective solutions to protect 
the free movement of people in an open system. 
Airport-style security and Passenger Name Record (PNR) 
Great attention was dedicated to the possibility of replicating the 
airport-style security model to the railway system. Everybody agreed 
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that this is actually not an option because of the different nature of 
the system. In particular, the possibility of including Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) codes, one of the key features of passengers’ air transport, 
was put forward. 
Several participants argued that nominal tickets could lead to lower 
ridership, as customers appreciate the flexibility of non-personalised 
tickets. Especially for public transport it is important that any new 
security approach allows the system to remain easy to use, cheap and 
flexible.
Adding PNR codes to the tickets would have to be in accordance 
with national data protection laws, creating the need for significant 
coordination efforts.
Furthermore, requiring that data be collected creates the risk that in 
the future, railway operators would be asked to check for it, therefore 
causing lines and negatively impacting customer experience and the 
profitability of the service.
The Forum concluded that PNR introduction would have a tremendous 
impact on the flow of passengers but bring no real advantage for security. 
New technologies for more security: who is bearing the cost? 
Railway transport has been so far a highly secure transport mode, and 
new technologies like CCTV surveillance, facial recognition, metal 
detectors and gate controls can improve it even more. It was commonly 
agreed that research should continue in the field of mass surveillance, 
rather than individual checks. However,  it was also conceded that it 
will not be possible to prevent everything. The rising level of attention 
towards security measures has an implication in terms of costs. 
New technologies are expensive and the costs of implementing them 
are an issue of great concern. Who is bearing security costs was one of 
the key points of the discussion. These costs must also be seen in the 
context of competition in railways. While most railway undertakings 
and infrastructure managers in the EU are state owned there is also a 
growing number of private actors in the sector. As costs for security 
measures, (particularly at stations) rise, the question will emerge as 
to how these costs will be distributed among the different public and 
private actors. 
In air transport these costs are included in the airport charges that are 
borne by airlines (and eventually the passengers). Such an approach 
is not an option for railway stations, which are not usually isolated, 
commercially run facilities like airports.
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Specific reference was made to whether it might be feasible to introduce 
security measures through technical requirements so that they are 
automatically built in to the equipment.
Authorities’ cooperation: who should be competent for what? 
General agreement was expressed at the Forum for the need to ensure 
the efficient exchange of information between competent authorities. 
There should be a requirement that a definition of roles, communication 
protocols and a lead coordinator, all to be decided at the national 
level, are in place so that states are prepared in the case of some kind 
of railway security threat. The idea is to have a clear contingency plan. 
Communication needs to be going on regularly, and even more so at 
a time of crisis. A question regarding the relationship between private 
railway security services and public authorities was discussed, especially 
with regard to the changing nature of security threats. 
To what extent should railway security services be entrusted with 
security tasks, and receive the necessary legal competencies? Substantial 
differences emerged among different national contexts. In France, for 
instance, a specialised unit has very far reaching competencies allowing 
for carrying guns whereas in Germany, railway security personnel has a 
very limited mandate.
While no one-size-fits-all solution could be identified, it was agreed that 
railway security forces and national police authorities need to have a 
joint approach with a clear division of labour and a free exchange of 
critical information. Railway security forces understand the railways 
best, are often the first responders in case of a security threat and can 
provide expertise and assistance to national police.
What can be done to adjust and improve the security level of 
infrastructure?
The discussion touched upon a variety of issues reaching beyond 
the security threat posed by terrorists, including general concerns of 
security in railways.
Cultural differences 
Railways are part of the Critical Infrastructures (CI). CI are the backbone 
of our society: they are the enablers of our contemporary complex 
economic, social and environmental eco-systems; at the same time, they 
are highly fragile and largely exposed to attacks, due to their intrinsic 
symbolic value. It was pointed out that transport infrastructures are not 
necessarily the main target for terrorist attacks. However, one of the key 
messages emerging from the discussion at the 13th Florence Rail Forum 
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was the need for improvement of the level of railway infrastructures’ 
security. 
Overall, everybody agreed that it is not possible to harmonise the 
different national approaches to security for infrastructures in the 
railway system because of the different cultures and perceptions of 
security. This is a challenge for any harmonised approach. 
Referring to stations, the debate was focused on the issue of public 
space, because of the different rules applying to public spaces and 
private spaces. Stakeholders agreed that new security efforts should 
not be aimed at turning the public space in and around stations into 
a closed environment, but rather how to make the public space a 
safer environment in general. Surveillance emerged as one of the key 
components in risk assessment and management. 
As far as the other parts of the railway infrastructures are concerned, the 
issue of metal thefts was analysed. The topic was perceived differently 
by stakeholders from different countries with different legal approaches 
to the issue. For example, in some countries metal theft is considered 
“normal” theft, whereas other countries foresee special provisions 
for “theft against a public service”. In this case, the importance of 
harmonisation without oversimplification was emphasised. 
Overall, railways are highly complex socio-technical systems, and 
security has different connotations. For all stakeholders it is important 
to have a clear position at the national (governmental) level to 
implement security of critical infrastructures because while having 
European wide implications the topic remains clearly under national 
jurisdiction. 
What can be done to improve staff training and to raise awareness 
among passengers?
Collaboration is the key word 
Discussion on staff training and passengers’ awareness with regard to 
security revolved around the need for improving the collaboration 
among different stakeholders (passengers, staff, operators’ management, 
and police forces) to make use of the expertise of the different actors.
Linking security to other objectives, such as crime prevention, can prove 
useful. For instance, linking security systems (such as CCTV) to safety 
management systems and cybersecurity management systems should 
be explored further, as their combination has the potential for greater 
effectiveness. Another example referred to the introduction of gates 
at platforms and the campaigns raising awareness among passengers. 
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It was noted that following the introduction of gates at platforms, for 
example in Milan or Rome, also petty theft on platforms went down. 
Here it was pointed out that vigilant passengers also need someone to 
report to, so staff at stations remains important. Furthermore, it was 
noted that it can be useful to look at technologies that are simple and 
that already exist. With regard to this, an alert system that in the case 
of a train delay prevents passengers from going to the station early and 
being forced to wait around (risking problems inside the station) was 
considered a useful tool also for security purposes.
The issue of proportionality: who is bearing the cost?
There was a lot of discussion of specific problems that could come up 
when determining who pays for security forces. Everybody agreed on 
the fact that costs should not be duplicated.
Like in other panels, the issues of proportionality and costs were 
discussed. A question was posed regarding what technique could be 
used to calculate proportionality, perhaps cost-benefit analysis. In this 
discussion round as well, the cultural differences emerged as a key 
aspect for the answer to this question. Usually, cost-benefit analysis is 
taken into account, yet in the case of security this should not be the 
deciding factor. The situation varies greatly from country to country. 
There are countries with a long tradition of spending in security works, 
like Norway, so the current impact on companies’ spending is not too 
significant. 
How should responsibility be distributed? Who should regulate and 
how?
Coordinated approach and clear division of tasks and responsibilities 
Naturally the Rail Forum also addressed the issue of distribution of 
competencies between the EU and national level. Security as such falls 
under national competence, yet the idea of the European Commission 
coming up with guidelines or best practices was welcomed at the Forum. 
It was conceded that Member States under the impression of terrorist 
events are facing a lot of pressure to adopt exaggerated and sometimes 
ineffective measurers, so it could be useful for the EU level to act as a 
rationalising power.
Everybody agreed that railway is a secure means of transport. To improve 
security further, more cooperation among the different stakeholders 
is required.
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Streamlined procedures are needed in order to address the risks of, 
on the one hand, overlapping responsibilities and, on the other hand, 
competence gaps. However, coordination does not mean a one-size-
fits-all approach. Agreement emerged that national experiences are not 
always transferrable to other places and an effective solution in one 
country might not be applicable in another one. 
Another dimension in the discourse on responsibilities was the division 
of responsibilities between public officials and railway staff for the 
enforcement of security measures: everybody agreed that railway 
operators’ responsibility can only go up to a certain point. However, 
the whole railway system was recognised to be rapidly evolving and 
the changing security risks may mean that a new balance needs to be 
defined. As railways are increasingly becoming a private business, this 
is also a financial question: is the security at stations part of the service 
that commercial railway operators have to bear the costs of? Or is it the 
role of the state e.g. the police? On the other hand, can police officers 
be entitled to control the tickets of rail passengers? Rules for this vary 
across Europe and they cannot easily be harmonised.
An interesting example also came from Japan: here the responsibility for 
security lies with the railway operator who takes this task very seriously. 
Security in the railways is constantly improved as an effort to make 
the railways attractive for passengers and to remain competitive with 
other modes. Private railway operators in Japan work closely with the 
government but usually improvement initiatives begin internally.
The idea of decentralisation of security tasks was put forward in the 
discussion, and the possibility of including the provision of security 
services in the tender procedures was suggested. Yet the implications 
in terms of access to premises and powers of enforcement were unclear. 
Discussion on the very nature of the railway security issue came 
back at the end of the Forum: security is one aspect of the railway 
business, and the railway system has to take security into consideration. 
If the transport industry does not manage to include security among 
its priorities in a satisfactory way, then decisions will be made (on 
the political level) that are not necessarily in the best interest of the 
transport industry. Therefore, it was recalled that the transport sector 
should include security among its own priorities instead of considering 
it an external aspect. 
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Further readings
Florence School of Regulation Transport Area, 2016, 13th Florence 
Rail Forum Summary of presentations 
Recent terrorist attacks directly targeted the European transport system 
(Thalys – 21 August 2015, Brussels metro and airport – 22 March 
2016). Public opinion is now particularly concerned, and companies as 
well as institutions have started to act to improve the security of the 
transport system. Major initiatives have been adopted by the European 
Commission (see, among others the new European Agenda on Security 
2015-2020 to support better cooperation between Member States in 
the fight against terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime), yet the 
actions that have been taken by the different Member States in the area 
of security in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks are not 
always consistent.
The aim of the 13th Florence Rail Forum was to look at the most 
controversial aspects creating a tension between increasing the level of 
security and market opening in the railway sector. While we acknowledge 
that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to rail security in Europe, we 
will try to identify some common aspects that could and even should 
be dealt with at the European level. Following the usual format of the 
Florence Forums, in each session speakers and participants will have 
the chance to contribute to the discussion moderated by Prof Matthias 
Finger (École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne and European 
University Institute). Representatives of the European Commission, of 
major stakeholders as well as academics will engage in the discussion.
The Forum looked at four different aspects of railway security and their 
possible impact on the SERA and the competiveness of the sector:
• What can be done to improve security?
• What can be done to adjust and improve the security level of 
infrastructure?
• What can be done to improve staff training and to raise awareness 
among passengers ?
• How should responsibility be distributed? Who should regulate and 
how?
Fiumara, F., 2015, “The Railway Security: Methodologies and 
Instruments for Protecting a Critical Infrastructure” in Setola, R., 
Sforza, A., Vittorini, V., Pragliola, C., 2015, “Railway Infrastructure 
Security” Springer International Publishing, 25-63
13 ■ Rail passenger security: is it a challenge for the Single European Railway Area? 
The book arises with the scope of improving the understanding of the 
vulnerabilities of infrastructure protection and providing efficient and 
effective strategies to reduce the risk of attacks and their consequences. 
In particular, the book makes reference to the Railway Infrastructure 
Systems (RISs). 
This chapter illustrates which are the methodologies and instruments for 
protecting one of the most critical infrastructures: the railway network. 
After a comprehensive overview about the potential threats, the chapter 
describes the security strategy, technologies and cooperation with 
Public Authorities which should be put in place to protect the railway 
infrastructure in a complete and effective way. 
Bruyelle J-L., O’Neill C., El-Koursi E-M., Hamelin F., Sartori N., 
2014, “Improving the resilience of metro vehicle and passengers for 
an effective emergency response to terrorist attacks” Safety Science, 
vol. 62, 37–45
In the framework of the European FP7 project SecureMetro, the authors 
have studied the occurrences of terrorist attacks against rail-based 
vehicles, in particular Underground trains, with the goal to reduce 
the number of attacks by making transport systems a less attractive 
target. Many counter-measures have already been implemented in 
a multi-layered manner to increase the resilience to terrorism, such 
as depot security, detection of explosives or passenger screening. The 
SecureMetro project adds another layer aimed at mitigating the effects of 
an attack to the vehicles, should the other layers fail to avoid it. The case 
of interest, a metro train blocked in a tunnel due to a bombing, has been 
chosen as representative of the attacks perpetrated in the recent years, 
and of the most difficult case to cope with. Based on the experience of 
the 7/7 London bombings and other emergency situations, as well as 
the currently admitted behaviour models, this paper identifies critical 
systems and proposes improvements to the design of metro coaches, in 
order to improve the management of the emergency situation, assist the 
evacuation and rescue to passengers.
Bulc, V., 2016, “Keynote Speech: Rail Passenger Security in the 
European Union”, Brussels, 10 May 2016
Ensuring the security of passengers and transport staff is a priority for 
the European Commission and the Member States of the European 
Union. To this respect, the European Commission organised on 10 May 
2016 a Conference with experts of rail passenger security which aimed 
to share ideas on rail security and stimulate discussion across the sector. 
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The EU relies on global connectivity and a strong single market. Safe and 
secure transport networks are therefore essential. And rail has a central 
part to play in our future multi-modal transport system. Commissioner 
Bulc addressed the public stating that “if we want an open mass transit 
system in place, there will always be some risk. The challenge and our 
duty is to reduce that risk as much as possible. Proportionate, effective 
actions are required in order to ensure the security and the sense of 
security that the public requires in order to use the rail network. It is 
also essential that, as far as possible, public transport remains open, 
attractive and easily accessible. Rail should remain as far as possible an 
open system in order for it to continue to function correctly as a means 
of mass transport.”
Mannisto, T., 2013, “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Network 
Industries”, Network Industries Quarterly, vol 15, no 4
Recent disasters evidence that failures in key infrastructures may result 
in severe economic, environmental, and social losses, even human 
casualties. Therefore, it’s not a surprise that governments worldwide 
are increasingly concerned about robustness and resiliency of national 
and regional infrastructures to natural disasters, operational accidents 
and other disruptive events. The mounting political attention has led 
to numerous national and regional initiatives that aim to identify, 
designate, and protect critical infrastructures that underpin our daily 
life. 
This issue of the Network Industries Quarterly is dedicated to the theory 
and the practice of critical infrastructure protection (CIP). The issue’s 
articles show that the network industries produce many products and 
services that are vital for the modern societies, and that these industries 
are vulnerable to disruptions. 
Masiero L., Maggi R., 2012, “Estimation of indirect cost and 
evaluation of protective measures for infrastructure vulnerability: a 
case study on the transalpine transport corridor” Transport Policy, 
vol. 20, 13–21
Infrastructure vulnerability is a topic of rising interest in the scientific 
literature for both the general increase of unexpected events and the 
strategic importance of certain links. Protective investments are 
extremely costly and risks are distributed in space and time which poses 
important decision problems to the public sector decision makers. In 
an economic prospective, the evaluation of infrastructure vulnerability 
is oriented on the estimation of direct and indirect costs of hazards. 
Although the estimation of direct costs is straightforward, the evaluation 
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of indirect cost involves factors non-directly observable making the 
approximation a difficult issue. This paper provides an estimate of the 
indirect costs caused by a two weeks closure of the north-south Gotthard 
road corridor, one of the most important infrastructure links in Europe, 
and implements a cost-benefit analysis tool that allows the evaluation of 
measures ensuring a full protection along the corridor. The identification 
of the indirect cost relies on the generalized cost estimation, which 
parameters come from two stated preference experiments, the first 
based on actual condition whereas the second assumes a road closure. 
The procedure outlined in this paper proposes a methodology aimed 
to identify and quantify the economic vulnerability associated with a 
road transport infrastructure and, to evaluate the economic and social 
efficiency of a vulnerability reduction by the consideration of protective 
measures.
Mattsson L-G., Jenelius E., 2015, “Vulnerability and resilience of 
transport systems – a discussion of recent research” Transportation 
Research Part A Policy and Practice, vol. 81, 16–34
The transport system is critical to the welfare of modern societies. This 
article provides an overview of recent research on vulnerability and 
resilience of transport systems. Definitions of vulnerability and resilience 
are formulated and discussed together with related concepts. In the 
increasing and extensive literature of transport vulnerability studies, 
two distinct traditions are identified. One tradition with roots in graph 
theory studies the vulnerability of transport networks based on their 
topological properties. The other tradition also represents the demand 
and supply side of the transport systems to allow for a more complete 
assessment of the consequences of disruptions or disasters for the users 
and society. The merits and drawbacks of the approaches are discussed. 
The concept of resilience offers a broader socio-technical perspective on 
the transport system’s capacity to maintain or quickly recover its function 
after a disruption or a disaster. The transport resilience literature is less 
abundant, especially concerning the post-disaster phases of response 
and recovery. The research on transport system vulnerability and 
resilience is now a mature field with a developed methodology and a large 
amount of research findings with large potential practical usefulness. 
The authors argue that more cross-disciplinary collaborations between 
authorities, operators and researchers would be desirable to transform 
this knowledge into practical strategies to strengthen the resilience of 
the transport system.
Florence School of Regulation,  
Transport Area
Robert Schuman Centre  
for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
Via Boccaccio, 121
50133 Florence
Italy 
Contact FSR-Transport:
 fsr.transport@eui.eu
FSR Transport 
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) is a project within the European University Institute (EUI) focusing 
on regulatory topics. It works closely with the European Commission, and is a growing point of reference for 
regulatory theory and practice. It covers four areas: Communications and Media, Energy (Electricity and Gas), 
and Transport & Water.
The FSR-Transport Area’s main activities are the European Transport Regulation Forums, which address policy 
and regulatory topics in different transport sectors. They bring relevant stakeholders together to analyse and 
reflect upon the latest developments and important regulatory issues in the European transport sector. These 
Forums inspire the comments gathered in this European Transport Regulation Observer.
Complete information on our activities can be found online at:  fsr.eui.eu
Content © Authors, 2016
© European University Institute, 2016
QM
-A
U-
16
-0
04
-E
N-
N
doi:10.2870/733231
ISBN:978-92-9084-370-2 
ISSN:2467-0405
16 ■  FSR Transport ■ Issue 2016/04 ■ November 2016
